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Abstract
One in every nine refugees worldwide is from Afghanistan, and Iran is one of main host countries for these refugees.
Close to 40 years of hosting Afghan refugees have depleted resources in Iran and resulted in promoting and
sometimes forcing repatriation. Repatriation of Afghan refugees from Iran to Afghanistan has been long facilitated by
humanitarian organizations with the premise that it will end prolonged displacement. However, lack of minimum
standards of living, among other factors such as private covered living area, can make repatriation far from a durable
solution. This study aims to highlight the value of access to shelter as a pull factor in ending forced displacement, by
comparing Afghan refugees’ housing situation in Iran with returnees’ access to shelter in Afghanistan. Findings suggest
that over 80% of surveyed Afghans in our study had access to private durable covered living space with minimum
standards of living in Iran. The documents retrieved in our systematic literature review show that access to similar
standards was between 30 and 73% among Afghan returnees. Results of our analysis call for reevaluation of
repatriation as a durable solution for Afghan displacement in the absence of decent shelter conditions, and
highlight a need for incorporation of shelter assistance programs into repatriation plans.
Keywords: Shelter, Afghan refugees, Afghan returnees, Repatriation

Introduction
In the mid-1970s, when conflict and political disputes
started in Afghanistan, Iran opened its borders and sheltered Afghan refugees on prima facie basis (Margesson
2007). This means that being an Afghan was sufficient evidence for receiving protection in Iran. Conflict and instability in Afghanistan continued with the Communist
coup and the Soviet Union’s invasion in 1979 (Margesson
2007; Ruiz 2004). During this period, which coincided
with the Iranian Islamic Revolution, Afghans were eligible
to receive refugee status at the borders of Iran as religious
immigrants (Moravej 2014). From the religious perspective of the new government in Iran, sheltering Afghans
was considered a help for Muslim brothers and sisters
(Marchand et al. 2014). Until 1992, Iran greeted Afghans
with open borders and granted them indefinite permission
to stay (Margesson 2007; Rajaee 2000). However, after
1992, Iran gradually put strategies in place to limit the
number of new refugee entries at its borders, encouraging
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and sometimes pressuring Afghans into voluntary repatriation. This change in policy was partly due to associated
financial and security costs of maintaining nearly two
million refugees in the aftermath of Iran's baby boom, the
expensive war with Iraq, and economic sanctions (Farrokhi
and Rahmati 2010; Rajaee 2000; Rostami-Povey 2008).
Voluntary repatriation to home countries, resettlement
in a third country, and local integration within the country of first asylum are the defined durable solutions by
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) to end refugee displacement (UNHCR 2016a).
Voluntary repatriation is the main durable solution for
the majority of refugees, as countries of first asylum are
usually reluctant to allow integration, and designated
quotas by countries accepting resettlement worldwide
are very limited. For instance, on the global scale, only
23,000 refugees were locally integrated and naturalized
within countries of first asylum and 189,300 refugees
were admitted for resettlement in a third country, while
over two and a half times this number repatriated to
their home countries in 2016 (UNHCR 2017a). For refugees with prima facie status, such as Afghans in Iran,
voluntary repatriation is commonly expected and usually
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enforced as soon as the country of origin is recognized
“safe” for return (Jacobsen 2005). However, the definition of “safe” is ambiguous and commonly misinterpreted to protect the interests of those in power.
Organized efforts by the Iranian government to facilitate the repatriation of Afghans began in late 1992
(Marchand et al. 2014). As far as Iran was concerned,
the Soviet war that created the Afghan refugee crisis was
over, and Afghanistan was “safe” enough for the return
of refugees (Qadeem 2005). To facilitate and encourage
repatriation of Afghans, Iran joined forces with the government of Afghanistan and the UNHCR in the framework of the Tripartite Commission (Adelkhah and
Olszewska 2007; Marchand et al. 2014; Rajaee 2000).
Under the operation of this commission, the UNHCR
would provide an assistance package consisting of
USD25 in cash, 50 kg of wheat, and a floor mat for
documented Afghan households who would give up
their refugee status in Iran and return to Afghanistan
(Rajaee 2000).
Beginning in 1993, Iran started to put policies in place
to make the country a less desirable destination for
Afghan refugees. For instance, the Iranian government
started to grant temporary registration cards to Afghan
refugees instead of indefinite permission (Margesson
2007). These temporary registration cards confined
Afghans to residence in refugee settlements or designated rural or urban areas (Rostami-Povey 2008). Starting in 1995, Iran closed its border with Afghanistan and
stopped accepting newly arrived Afghans at the border
on a prima facie basis (Garakani 2009; Marchand et al.
2014). In the course of the succeeding years, Afghans
have had to prove owning a well-founded fear of
persecution to earn a refugee status in Iran. Moreover,
after 1995, Iran increasingly enacted measures to control
refugees’ access to free or subsidized resources such as
education, energy, and health services (Garakani 2009;
Marchand et al. 2014; Margesson 2007; Rajaee 2000;
Rostami-Povey 2008).
Despite the above-discussed changes in policies, Iran
remained one of the essential destinations for Afghan
refugees, as their home country continued to struggle
with wars and conflicts. Besides the geographic proximity to Iran, the similarity in the language and culture of
the country makes it a desirable destination for Shia
Muslim and Dari/Farsi speaking Afghans such as
Hazaras (Azizi et al. 2017). Shortly after the Soviet
Union withdrew from Afghanistan, the Taliban, an
Islamic fundamentalist political movement with a repressive interpretation of Islamic law, took control of
parts of Afghanistan (Ruiz 2004). Their austere interpretation of Islamic law raised more conflict and forced
many Afghans to flee the country (Qadeem 2005). By
1996, the Taliban had assumed control of Afghanistan,
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except for 20% in the north, which was controlled by the
Northern Alliance who opposed the oppressive Taliban
rules (Qadeem 2005; Sharp et al. 2002). Due to their financial needs and extreme political views, the Taliban
sheltered the terrorist group al-Qaeda, leading to the
start of another war in Afghanistan in 2001 (Sharp et al.
2002). In October 2001, Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF), supported by Special Operations Forces from all
three USA military services and coalition partners,
attacked Afghanistan to remove the Taliban from power
(Ender 2010). After massive aerial bombardment began as
part of the OEF attack, one in every four Afghans was
already living as a refugee in another country (Ruiz 2004).
In the same year that the USA-led attack on Afghanistan
started, Iran introduced an integrated registration system
for refugees called Amayesh (Adelkhah and Olszewska
2007). Registration cards replaced all other previously issued documents for Afghans and became the only valid
refugee documentation in Iran (UNHCR 2014). Through
Amayesh cards, Iran limited how long refugees could stay
in the country and where they could reside (Barr and
Sanei 2013). The Bureau for Aliens and Foreign Immigrants Affairs (BAFIA), which has carried out Amayesh
registration schemes annually since 2010, is the entity in
charge of refugees in Iran (UNHCR 2014). According to
the Country of Origin Information Centre report on
Afghan citizens in Iran, refugees had to pay up to USD200
for municipal tax and USD15 to renew their refugee status
(Landinfo 2012). Beginning in 2007, the government of
Iran placed additional restrictions on issuing any new
Amayesh cards for undocumented refugees or newly arrived Afghans, and stopped new refugee registration (Barr
and Sanei 2013). Since 2007, only previously registered
Afghans with valid Amayesh cards can continue renewing
their cards and live as documented refugees in Iran. Lack
of documentation places Afghans at risk of arrest and
deportation to Afghanistan (Koepke 2011).
Besides enacting restrictive regulations for refugees,
Iran in collaboration with UNHCR continued to facilitate voluntary and sometimes forced repatriation of
Afghans. In 2002, while the USA-led war was ongoing in
Afghanistan, Iran signed the tripartite agreement with
Afghanistan and the UNHCR to expedite the repatriation of millions of Afghans (Barr and Sanei 2013).
Additionally, in 2012, Iran joined a new initiative called
the Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees to Support
Voluntary Repatriation, Sustainable Reintegration and
Assistance to Host Countries to advance the repatriation
of Afghans (Barr and Sanei 2013).
The war in Afghanistan officially ended in 2014. However,
large numbers of Afghans remained in protracted refugee
situations in Iran. Many Afghans are second-generation refugees in Iran. According to the data collected in 2005, over
30% of the documented Afghans were second-generation,
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meaning that they arrived as children or born in Iran
(Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2008). According to UNHCR’s latest
global trend report, 11% of refugees worldwide are from
Afghanistan and around 40% of this population resides in
Iran (UNHCR 2017a, b, c). Iran hosts the largest urban
refugee population in the world; 951,142 documented
Afghan refugees live in this country, and around 97% of
them live in urban and semi-urban areas (UNHCR 2015a,
b). Besides documented refugees, there are between half a
million to two million undocumented Afghans in Iran who
either arrived after the restriction of new Amayesh cards or
could not afford to renew their cards (Azizi et al. 2017;
Koepke 2011; Marchand et al. 2014; Milani 2006; Rajaee
2000; Scalettaris 2010).
As a result of the efforts to encourage and sometimes pressure Afghans into repatriation, over 4.2
million Afghans returned or were deported to
Afghanistan from Iran between 1992 and 2010
(Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2008; Koepke 2011; Majidi
2017; Marchand et al. 2014). UNHCR reports on
documented refugees show that 920,161 Afghans
returned from Iran between 2002 and 2014 (UNHCR
2015a). For the past decade, Afghanistan has consistently been one of the main countries of origin receiving returnees globally (Majidi 2017). In 2011,
around one-third of the population in Afghanistan
were returnees (Loschmann et al. 2015). Despite
their large population, the living situation of Afghan
returnees is one of the most understudied areas in
the forced migration field (Majidi 2017).
For returnees, access to minimum standards of living
in Afghanistan could be a cornerstone of stability and a
key to successful repatriation. Access to minimum standards of living could also be an important pull factor to
initiate or encourage the return. Among minimum standards of living, access to a covered living area is a fundamental human need and an essential element in the
provision of protection, dignity, and identity for returnees (Babister and Kelman 2002). Moreover, access
to a covered living area could be an essential element
for households’ livelihood and socio-economic development (Babister and Kelman 2002; Crea et al. 2017;
Loschmann et al. 2015). In the harsh winters and hot
summers of Afghanistan, access to shelter could be a
crucial factor for survival. Therefore, lack of access to
shelter for the large population of Afghan returnees
could be a cause for concern, and an important factor
to consider in repatriation strategies. To explore this
concern, our study aims to document the shelter profile of Afghan refugees in Iran and returnees in
Afghanistan. In this context, this study explores the
housing situation of Afghan refugees in Iran and
compares it with reported accommodation conditions
of Afghan returnees.
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Conceptual framework
The conceptual model of the study and our definition of
shelter or housing is grounded in the minimum standards
for “covered living space” and “design” as described in the
Sphere Project (2011) handbook. The Sphere Project
handbook is a guideline that defines minimum standards
in humanitarian response. Although the handbook has no
time limitation, it is mainly focused on disaster-affected
populations. While Afghan returnees could be considered
a disaster-affected population in the case of secondary displacement, refugees in Iran are in a protracted and stable
situation. Therefore, the listed minimum standards by the
Sphere Project handbook could be far from an ideal
framework for refugee housing in Iran. However, the listed
minimum standards by this handbook provide a minimum
baseline for comparison between Afghan refugees in Iran
and returnees in Afghanistan.
Five indicators were defined in this study to assess
housing situations based on the Sphere Project (2011)
handbook (1) minimum covered area of 3.5 m2 per person; (2) households’ access to a private covered cooking
area (kitchen); (3) households’ access to a private latrine;
(4) households’ access to electricity; and (5) households’
access to piped water (Table 1). These five indicators
were defined based on the first and third indicators
under the Sphere Project’s minimum standards for a
“covered living space,” and the fifth indicator of the
Sphere Project’s minimum standards in “design.”
Due to limitation of data, indicators related to privacy
and livelihood activities under the Sphere Project’s minimum standards for a “covered living space” and four of
the indicators related to Sphere Project’s minimum standards in “design” were excluded in our study.
Methodology
Data and information sources

This study is based on two information sources: (1) a descriptive analysis of cross-sectional data collected from
Afghan refugees in Iran in 2011 (Ahmadinejad 2011),
and (2) a systematic literature review in English and
Farsi in regard to the housing situation of Afghan refugees in Iran and returnees in Afghanistan.
The cross-sectional data was utilized to report on the
housing situation of Afghan refugees in Iran. This dataset
was collected in 2011 through convenience sampling and
structured interviews with heads of Afghan households in
the capital cities of the five most refugee-populated
provinces in Iran: Tehran, Khorasan-e Razavi, Isfahan,
Kerman, and Fars. Available statistics from 2011 show that
more than half of the documented refugees in Iran lived
in provinces of Tehran, Khorasan-e Razavi, and Isfahan
(Azizi et al. 2017). Moreover, according to the Amayesh
registration scheme carried out in 2011, Kerman and Fars
province together host around 15% of the documented
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Table 1 Housing indicators
The sphere project indicators

Proxy indicators for this study

Indicators for covered living space
1. The initial covered floor area per person is at least 3.5 m2

1. Per head covered area of 3.5 m2;

2. The covered area enables safe separation and privacy between the sexes, between different
age groups, and between separate families within a given household as required

Excluded due to lack of data

3. Essential household activities can be carried out within the shelter

2. Access to a private covered cooking
area (kitchen);
3. Access to a private latrine;

4. Key livelihood support activities are accommodated where possible

Excluded due to lack of data

Indicators for design
1. The design of the shelter and the materials used are familiar where possible and culturally
and socially acceptable

Excluded due to lack of data

2. The repair of existing damaged shelters or the upgrading of initial shelter solutions
constructed by the disaster-affected population is prioritized

Excluded due to lack of data

3. Alternative materials required to provide temporary shelter are durable, practical, and
acceptable to the affected population

Excluded due to lack of data

4. The type of construction, materials used, and the sizing and positioning of openings provides
optimal thermal comfort and ventilation

Excluded due to lack of data

5. Access to water supply sources and sanitation facilities, and the appropriate provision of
rainwater harvesting, water storage, drainage, and solid waste management, complement the
construction of shelters

4. Access to electricity;
5. Access to piped water;

6. Vector control measures are incorporated into the design and materials are selected to
minimize health hazards

Excluded due to lack of data

Source: The Sphere Project (2011)

refugees in Iran. Sixteen university-educated and local
Afghan refugees, who were the recipients of the Albert
Einstein German Academic Refugee Initiative Fund in the
above-mentioned provinces, conducted the interviews. Interviewers were instructed to fill the questionnaires in
refugee-populated communities by starting from the first
house in the area and approaching every fifth house to
complete a maximum number of 150 questionnaires
(Ahmadinejad 2011). The data were collected through
45-min structured interviews with the heads of the households, using an adapted version of the Statistical Center of
Iran (2010) questionnaire for measuring expenditures and
income. During these structured interviews, each household head provided information about every member of
the household, resulting in a sample size of 2034 households and 10,889 individuals.
The systematic literature review was conducted to report on Afghan returnees’ access to shelter in 2011,
trends and progresses made since, and available shelter
assistance programs and interventions for Afghan returnees. The review was conducted online, in English
and Farsi, and in three major social science databases:
Web of Science Core Collection, PsycInfo, and Google
Scholar. The search was conducted on 4 May 2018 using
keywords related to “returnee,” “refugee,” “shelter,”
“Afghan,” and “Iran.” The reference lists of the retrieved
related documents, and the online archive of the Human
Rights Watch reports, UNHCR website, International

Organization for Migration (IOM) publications, World
Bank country level data, and Norwegian Refugee Council
(NRC) resources were also reviewed.
Analyses

Access of Afghan refugees to the five defined proxy indicators for shelter was calculated using our secondary
cross-sectional dataset and descriptive statistics analyses
with Stata software version 14 (StataCorp 2015). The
minimum per head covered living area was calculated by
dividing the reported total area of living to total number
of household members. Access to a private covered
cooking area, private latrine, and piped water was calculated based on the self-reported data by heads of the
households (private access, shared access, no access) to
kitchen, toilet, and piped water. Access to electricity was
not recorded in our dataset; therefore, we used the
World Bank country level data on access to electricity in
2011 in Iran (The World Bank 2017). Through our
systematic literature review we retrieved information
about Afghan returnees’ access to the five defined proxy
indicators for shelter.

Results
Study findings are presented under three headings: (1)
demographic characteristics of the surveyed Afghan refugees in Iran and their housing situation based on the conceptual framework of the study; (2) Afghan returnees’
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general housing situation in 2011 and their shelter profile
based on the conceptual framework of the study; (3) comparison between shelter indicators for surveyed refugees
in Iran and retrieved information about returnees in
Afghanistan; (4) and review of the trends since 2011.
Afghan refugees’ housing in Iran

The utilized cross-sectional dataset in this study constitute the data of 2034 Afghan households, out of which
84.3% (1715 households) had valid Amayesh cards and
15.7% (319 households) were undocumented. Around
83% (1687 households) of the sample resided in urban
and semi-urban areas, around 9.5% (194 households) in
colonies, and 7.5% (153 households) in government-run
settlements (camps). Around 20% (405 households) of
the surveyed households were in Tehran, around 19%
(394 households) were in Khorasan-e Razavi, around
18% (365 households) were in Isfahan, around 20% (400
households) were in Kerman, and around 23% (470
households) were in Fars province. Average years of residency in Iran among the surveyed households was 20.1
(SD = 8.9) years, ranging between 1 month and 50 years.
Average years of residency in Iran were lower among
Afghans in Tehran and Fars province, and those residing
in colonies and urban and semi-urban areas. Average
age of the heads of the households was 43 (SD = 13.3),
and around 95% of them (1924 heads of households)
were born in Afghanistan and the rest were born in Iran
or other countries. The majority of the interviewees
were Hazara (67%, 1361 households), around 14% (292
households) were Pashtun, around 6.2% (125 households) were Tajik, and the rest were of other ethnicities.
Average household size was 5.3, with the minimum
household size of one to a maximum of 19 members.
Among the surveyed Afghan refugee households in
our sample, 98.5% had access to a private durable covered living space (Table 2). More specifically, 80.7%
(1640 households) lived in rental properties, 8.2% (166
households) owned their houses, 5.9% (120 households)
lived in refugee settlements, 2.7% (55 households) were
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guards and lived in guardhouses, and 1.1% (22 households) lived and worked on construction fields. Only
1.5% (30 households) of the surveyed refugee households
in Iran did not have access to a private durable covered
living space, as they lived with extended family members
or friends. No one in our sample reported living in temporary shelters or uncovered accommodation settings.
Access to rental properties and house ownership was
very similar among documented refugees and undocumented Afghans in our sample, yet undocumented
Afghans were more likely than documented refugees to
live in guardhouses (4.7% for undocumented and 2.33
for documented), live and work on construction fields
(3.1% for undocumented and 0.7% for documented), or
live with their extended family members or friends (3.5%
for undocumented and 1.2% for documented). Chances
for refugees to own a house was considerably higher
among refugees living in Khorasan-e Razavi (35.3%)
compared to Afghans living in other provinces (less than
2 %) in our sample. Moreover, all refugees who owned a
house lived in Iran at least for 10 years.
The average accommodation area for an Afghan refugee
household with an average 5.3 members was 78.2 m2. The
per capita covered accommodation area was larger than
3.5 m2 for most (around 96%) of the surveyed households
(Table 2). Access to minimum 3.5 square per capita covered accommodation area was only slightly different between documented (around 96%) and undocumented
(around 97%) Afghans. The majority of households with a
covered area of less than 3.5 m2 lived in settlements
(42%), resided in Kerman (68%), and lived with extended
family members and friends (45%, 34 households).
Nearly 84% (1705 households) of the surveyed Afghan
refugee households in Iran had access to a private
kitchen, over 82% (1676 households) had access to a
private latrine, and over 98% (2002 households) had
access to piped water (Table 2). Access to a private
kitchen, a private latrine, and piped water was slightly
higher among documented refugees compared to undocumented Afghans (85 versus 75%; 83 versus 77%;

Table 2 Comparison of Afghan refugees’ and returnees’ housing and standards of living
Minimum standards of housing

Access level of refugee households in Irana

Access level of returnees in Afghanistanb

Access to a private durable covered living space

Over 98%

Around 35%

Access to minimum per head covered area

Over 96%

Around 50%

Access to a private covered cooking area

Over 83%

No data

Access to a private latrine

Over 82%

29.90%

Access to electricity

Over 99%

61.51%

Access to piped water

Over 98%

72.60%

a

All access levels are calculated based on the dataset collected in 2011 among Afghan refugees in Iran except access level to electricity, which is based on the
World Bank’s country level data in 2011
b
Access to a private durable covered living space and minimum per head covered area are based on the IOM baseline mobility assessment report (2017) in
Nangarhar, Kunar, and Laghman provinces in Afghanistan; access to private latrine in 2011 is based on the WHO and UNICEF (2017) report; access to electricity in
2011 is based on the World Bank’s country level data (2017); and access to piped water in 2011 is based on the Global Economy (2018) website

Naseh et al. Journal of International Humanitarian Action (2018) 3:13

and 99.5 versus 98% respectively). The majority of the
household members without access to a private kitchen,
latrine, or piped water lived with extended families and
friends or lived in rental properties. Access to a private
kitchen or a private latrine was considerably lower
among Afghans living in settlements (46 and 25%) compared to those living in urban and semi-urban areas (88
and 88%) or colonies (78 and 80%). Access to electricity
was over 99% in 2011 in Iran, and the same level of
access was considered for Afghan refugees in this study
(Table 2).

Returnees’ housing in Afghanistan

Nangarhar, Kandahar, Nimroz, and Herat province are
the main points of entry for returnees in Afghanistan.
Although Kabul is not a border province, it is the second
largest province receiving returnees after Nangarhar. For
returnees from Iran, Herat, Nimroz, and Kabul are the
main destinations. Post-arrival humanitarian assistance
is available in these provinces, but humanitarian organizations are more active in Nangarhar and Kandahar. For
instance, IOM assisted 92% of the undocumented Afghans from Pakistan in Nangarhar in 2017, but only
assisted 5% of the undocumented Afghans from Iran in
Nimroz (Kamminga and Zaki 2018). Studies and reports
on Afghan returnees in Herat and Nimroz provinces are
also scarce. One reason for this gap in the literature is
that the population of returnees from Iran is considerably lower than returnees from Pakistan. Another reason
is that returnees from Iran tend to live among host communities, as they used to in Iran, while returnees from
Pakistan are more likely to live separately from local
communities, as they lived mainly in camps in Pakistan.
Few Afghan returnees own property in Afghanistan
and the majority live in rented houses upon return (Kent
et al. 2017). In a study conducted by UNHCR, lack of
land was the main concern of more than half of the returnees, and lack of shelter was the main concern of
over 15% of the returnees (UNHCR 2017b). One of the
reasons for lack of access to shelter for Afghan returnees
is that years of conflict destroyed many properties and
changed land ownerships. Returnees are either unable to
reclaim their properties or do not own land; therefore,
they have to rent. However, the current emphasis on
Afghan repatriation created an influx of returnees, and
impacted Afghanistan’s housing market by creating high
and unaffordable rent costs (IOM 2017). Only in 2017,
around 59,000 refugees and nearly 500,000 undocumented Afghans returned to Afghanistan (Majidi 2017).
Consequently, returnees are forced to rent houses in remote areas that have lower rates, share a house with
other families to make rents more affordable, live in
tents or sub-standard shelters, borrow money to afford
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rents, rely on child labor to increase income, or live in
open areas (IOM 2017; Samuel Hall et al. 2018).
High rent costs in recent years have led to the eviction
of many returnees from their residences, forcing them to
live in tents, half-constructed buildings, or in the open
air (IOM 2017; Kent et al. 2017). In some cases, returnees are forced to move constantly in search of more
affordable housing (Samuel Hall et al. 2018). An IOM
baseline mobility assessment report (2017) shows that
rents have nearly doubled between mid-2016 and March
2017 in Nangarhar province in Afghanistan, and prices
are expected to further increase if the influx of returnees
continues. This assessment, which was conducted in
Nangarhar, Kunar, and Laghman, estimates that around
14% of the returnees lived in tents or open areas, and
only 35% had access to a private durable covered living
space (IOM 2017). This assessment also indicates that
more than 50% of returnees in these three provinces live
with families or friends (IOM 2017). Another survey
conducted by the IOM in Nangarhar province shows
that up to 40% of the Afghan returnees lived in open
areas or semi-constructed buildings (IOM 2016). A
study by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) and the
NRC found similar results and reports that hundreds
of Afghan returnees live under open skies (Simpson
et al. 2017).
Through our systematic search, we found no data on
minimum per head covered area of living for Afghan
returnees, but living in overcrowded shelters was evident
(IOM 2017; Simpson et al. 2017). Unable to own or
reclaim properties in Afghanistan, large numbers of
returnees are forced to live with families and friends or
in overcrowded settlements due to high costs of rent
(Assessment Capacities Project 2016; IOM 2017;
Simpson et al. 2017). It has been estimated that in 2009,
around 80% of the population in Kabul, including returnees, lived in squatter settlements (Schmeidl 2009).
We were unable to find data on Afghan returnees’
access to a kitchen. However, we estimated access to
electricity and piped water based on the World Bank
country level data and the Global Economy website. According to these sources, access to electricity was 61.51%
in 2011 and increased to 84.1 in 2016 (The World Bank
2017). Moreover, access to drinking water in urban areas
was 72.6% in 2011 and improved to 78.2% in 2015 (The
Global Economy 2018). Nevertheless, lower levels of
access to piped water were reported in small-scale studies at the provincial level. For instance, IOM baseline
mobility assessment report in Nangarhar province shows
that around 90% of the Afghans, including returnees, did
not have access to tap water (IOM 2017). The same report reveals that in Laghman province lack of access to
piped water forced returnees to use wells, natural water
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sources, and water tankers (IOM 2017). Country level
access to improved sanitation including private latrine
was 29.90% in 2011 and increased to 31.90 in 2015
(WHO and UNICEF 2017) (Table 2).
Comparison

Based on our 2011 data, the housing situation of
Afghan refugees in Iran was better across all five
reviewed indicators compared to returnees’ situation in
Afghanistan (Table 2). Access levels depicted in Table 2
should be interpreted with care as there was variation
in sampling methods, locations, and target population
of the resources. Refugees’ access level to four out of
the five defined indicators in Iran was calculated based
on a cross-sectional survey in the five most refugee
populated provinces of Iran in 2011, while access to
electricity was estimated based on a country level data.
Similarly, access to a latrine, piped water, and electricity
among returnees in Afghanistan was estimated based
on the country level data and might not exactly depict
returnees’ situation. Data on access to a private durable
covered living space and minimum per head covered
area was extracted from studies in Nangarhar, Kunar,
and Laghman provinces. These three provinces are
mainly receiving returnees from Pakistan and might not
reflect the situation of returnees from Iran. However,
since a similar data was not available for Herat or
Nimroz, the main points of entry for returnees from
Iran, these access levels were reported to provide a
baseline for comparison (Fig. 1).
Trends

Our systematic search on trends in housing situation of
Afghan refugees in Iran after 2011 found no indication
of homelessness. However, difficulty in affording shelter
by the most vulnerable groups, and a need to repair and
upgrade in refugee resettlements, was indicated in the
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NRC Factsheet and UNHCR portfolio of projects reports
on Solution Strategy in Iran (NRC 2017; UNHCR 2014,
2015a). Most of the refugee settlements in Iran were
built before the 1980s and need major upgrades. Humanitarian organizations including NRC and UNHCR
have active construction projects for rehabilitation of infrastructures in these settlements. There are 20 settlements in Iran, and around 3% of the documented
refugees live in these settings (UNHCR 2015a). The findings on low standards of housing in settlements were in
line with our descriptive statistic results from 2011. Our
systematic search did not find any data on access to a
private durable covered living space, average per capita
covered accommodation area, access to a private kitchen, latrine, or piped water among Afghan refugees in
Iran after 2011.
Likewise, we were unable to find a comprehensive report or study on returnees’ access to the five reviewed
minimum standards of shelter after 2011 in Afghanistan.
However, in recent years, small-scale reports and studies
show similar trends in lack of access to shelter among
returnees (Barr and Sanei 2013; Majidi 2017; Simpson et
al. 2017; UNHCR 2017c). In a quantitative survey
conducted in Herat, Kabul, Kandahar, Kunduz, and
Nangarhar provinces in Afghanistan, around 45% of the
Internally Displaced People (IDP) were returnees (Majidi
2017). There is no clear statistics on the number of
returnees who are forced to secondary displacement due
to lack of access to shelter, but reports and studies
confirm that housing is a major challenge. For instance,
lack of a decent land, housing, or shelter was the main
challenge cited by 79% of the interviewed returnee-IDPs
in five provinces of Afghanistan (Majidi 2017). In
Majidi’s study (2017), access to housing was the third
leading factor, after security and job opportunities, to
encourage IDPs to move. Although access to a private
latrine, electricity, and piped water has increased in

Fig. 1 Comparison of Afghan refugees’ and returnees’ housing and standards of living
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Afghanistan since 2011, all access levels are still lower
than refugees’ access to these services in Iran in 2011.
Shelter assistance programs for returnees

As part of the efforts to facilitate repatriation and reintegration of Afghans, shelter and land assistance programs
have been implemented in Afghanistan by different
humanitarian and governmental organizations. Land
Allocation Scheme (LAS) might be one of the most
important interventions by the government in this field.
The LAS initiative started in 2005 by the Ministry of
Refugees and Repatriation in Afghanistan to allocate
intact governmental lands to returnees and IDPs
(Macdonald 2011). Under this initiative, landless Afghan
returnees can apply to receive temporary land ownership
deeds. By 2013, over 13,700 land plots were distributed
to landless returnees or IDPs through LAS (Majidi
2013). However, several reports indicated that the program struggled to deliver on its pledge. It has been reported that a considerable number of beneficiaries of the
LAS program have sold their lands on the black market,
or handed them to friends or family members, and
moved to the outskirts of Afghanistan’s capital city or
left the country entirely (Majidi 2013; Rao and Turkstra
2014). The remote locations of the allocated lands, lack
of access to livelihood activities, and basic standards of
living such as piped water, latrines, primary education,
and health care are among the main reported reasons
for abandonment of the allocated lands (Majidi 2013;
Rao and Turkstra 2014). Some believe that LAS is a
form of exclusion and discrimination as recipients are
forced to live on deserted and remote locations (Majidi
2013). Out of the 38,000 recipients of the plots in 2011,
only 24% moved in and lived in the allocated lands
(Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction [SIGAR] 2015). Corruption and lack of transparency
in allocation process was also reported as a main challenge for LAS (The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 2017). In 2011, only 14% of the
applicants received land plots, and several instances of
corruption was reported (SIGAR 2015). More importantly, lands are only allocated in returnees’ area of origin, but over 45% of returnees live in areas other than
those of their origin (UNHCR 2015b).
With regard to shelter assistance programs, provision
of emergency and durable shelters has been more common in Afghanistan. Emergency shelters are easily set
up and used for short periods of time, usually less than
1 year. Different types of tents fall under this category of
shelters. Durable shelters are constructs that provide
durable covered living areas and can last an average of
10 years or more (UNHCR 2016b). Houses built with
common materials such as bricks or mud fall in this category. Transitional shelters are the third category of
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shelters, which are more durable than emergency shelters and usually last for two to a maximum of 5 years
(UNHCR 2016b). Prefabricated shelters including Refugee Housing Units (RHU) fall in this category.
In 2011, UNHCR and NRC were leading the main durable shelter assistance programs in Afghanistan. The
UNHCR shelter assistance program consisted of a cash
assistance (between USD50 and USD200), donation of
some construction materials, provision of doors and
windows, donation of roofing beams, and supervision
for construction of an average 32 m2 durable mud house
in 2 months (The Maastricht Graduate School of
Governance [MGSOG] and Samuel Hall 2012). This
program provided 220,000 units of shelter between 2002
and 2012 for Afghans, with an estimated cost of
USD1800 to USD2000 per unit (MGSOG and Samuel
Hall 2012). The NRC shelter assistance program was a
predominantly cash-based and community driven program that offered construction of one- and two-room
durable shelters with private latrines for Afghans in
Kabul, Kunduz, Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar, and Khost
provinces in Afghanistan (NRC 2015). If Afghan returnee households could provide unskilled labor and
construction materials, worth between 30 and 40% of
the NRC’s cash assistance, then this organization would
help them build a two-room shelter, and, if not, Afghans
would be provided with sufficient cash to build a
one-room house (Wyckoff 2016). The NRC shelter
assistance program provided cash assistance in installments for shelter, and the cash grant for each unit was
USD1200 in 2012 (MGSOG and Samuel Hall 2012;
Wyckoff 2016).
A published evaluation report on these programs
showed that Afghan households had to contribute between USD285 and USD977 to be able to finish the
UNHCR mud houses, and construction periods usually
took more than the planned 2 months (MGSOG and
Samuel Hall 2012). Moreover, this report showed that
NRC cash grants could only cover 50% of the required
funding for a complete shelter (MGSOG and Samuel Hall
2012). More importantly, only returnees with access to
land could benefit from these programs, and for many returnees, the two- or one-room houses offered could not
satisfy the minimum standard of per capita covered living
area (MGSOG and Samuel Hall 2012). The UNHCR shelter assistance program, however, changed after 2013. The
progress report under the framework of the Solutions
Strategy shows that since the initiation of this program,
over 3000 new shelter units were built for over 18,000
returnees in Afghanistan (UNHCR 2015b). Moreover, this
progress report showcases that UNHCR, NRC, and
United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UNHabitat) have been providing cash assistances for returnees to cover rents (UNHCR 2015b).
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The Information, Counselling, and Legal Assistance
(ICLA) program of NRC is another initiative that helps
returnees with access to shelter. Many Afghans who
owned land in the past lived in exile for decades; during
this period, various groups in power seized properties and
re-distributed lands in the absence of a national and unified law (Macdonald 2011). Consequently, many returnees
have found their homes destroyed or their lands occupied
and remained unable to solve a dispute over a property
with multiple layers of seizure or occupation (Macdonald
2011; Schmeidl 2009). Under the ICLA, NRC helps these
returnees realize and dispute their property rights
(Montygierd-Loyba et al. 2014). However, the scale of the
program is too small to solve systematic gaps in
Afghanistan. For instance, the country lacks formal documentation system for land ownership, and the traditional
justice system has bias and often favors families in power
(Macdonald 2011; Montygierd-Loyba et al. 2014; Roe 2008).

Discussion and conclusion
In this study, we only reviewed refugees’ and returnees’
access to minimum required covered living area and
their access to a private latrine, kitchen, electricity, and
piped water. It is worth mentioning that solving shelter
problems for refugees or returnees requires a holistic approach, and the minimum discussed standards cannot
guarantee successful reintegration or stability in the absence of other basic needs. The five reviewed indicators
in this study are simply a minimum baseline for shelter,
and comprehensive needs of refugees and returnees
should be taken into consideration while addressing
displacement.
Study findings show that access to the reviewed minimum standards of shelter could be a challenge for
Afghan returnees. The living conditions of some Afghan
returnees are so dire that their lives can be put at risk
(Simpson et al. 2017). As stated by Afghan returnees
themselves, shelter is their most important need and an
essential element in their reintegration into Afghan
society (Assessment Capacities Project 2016). It is
estimated that 900,000 people will need shelter assistance
in Afghanistan in 2018 and among them are 440,000
returnees (United States Agency for International
Development [USAID] 2017). The literature suggests that
lack of access to a durable shelter is one of the main
reasons for the secondary displacement of Afghan returnees (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2005; Barr and Sanei 2013;
Macdonald 2011; Schmeidl 2009; Milani 2006; Simpson et
al. 2017). Estimates show that on average around 15% of
the registered returnees in Afghanistan are forced to secondary displacement (UNHCR 2012). Afghan returnees
who are forced to secondary displacement may stay with
the borders of Afghanistan or may decide to pass international borders once more in search of protection.
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Afghan returnees who are forced into secondary displacement and remain within the borders of Afghanistan
join the mushrooming population of IDPs. Population of
IDPs in Afghanistan increased drastically between 2012
and 2016, partly due to increased population of returnees (Samuel Hall et al. 2018). More than one in
every 35 Afghans was an IDP in 2016 (Ahmadi and
Lakhani 2016). In 2018, IDP population reached 1.5
million (International Displacement Monitoring Center
[IDMC] 2018). Afghan IDPs live in some of the country’s
worst conditions, lacking access to basic needs such as
food, education, healthcare, and housing (Samuel Hall et
al. 2018; Simpson et al. 2017). Three quarters of IDPs in
Afghanistan do not receive any assistance and resort to
harmful coping strategies including sending children out
to work and skipping meals (Samuel Hall et al. 2018). According to a report by Samuel Hall, NRC, and IDMC
(2018), over 20% of returnee-IDPs rely on child labor.
Afghan returnees who are forced into secondary displacement may pass international borders, and higher
access levels to shelter and minimum standards of living
for refugees in Iran could be an important pull factor to
encourage their decision. However, Afghans who come
back to Iran after repatriation might not be able to qualify for refugee status once more and could be forced to
live as undocumented Afghans (Abbasi-Shavazi et al.
2005; Barr and Sanei 2013; Milani 2006; Schmeidl 2009).
In this context, repatriation is creating a vicious circle
adding to the vulnerability of Afghans instead of creating
a solution to end their displacement. Our review shows
that heavy investments in repatriation programs and
Iran’s new policies encouraged and sometimes forced
Afghans to leave their rather stable living situations in
Iran, returning to sub-standard housing or secondary
displacement in Afghanistan. While the return is called
“voluntary,” often Afghans have minimal input in the
decision-making process and are provided with little information about what they can expect after their return
(Majidi 2017). For younger generations born and raised
in Iran without ties in Afghanistan, repatriation is not
considered a return to home, but a displacement to a
new country. Furthermore, return is commonly perceived as a failure, and stigma associated with it can further isolate the returnees (Majidi 2017). These factors
can make coping with the challenges of return difficult
for Afghans, especially in the absence of a comprehensive repatriation plan to assure access to minimum standards of living after return. Our findings show that
policies to encourage repatriation are not well supported
to assure successful return. Moreover, our review found
lack of coordination between different sectors resulting
in failure of assistance programs such as land allocation.
The actions of UNHCR in promoting voluntary repatriation as a durable solution, in the absence of decent
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housing in Afghanistan, creates vulnerability and forces
Afghans to languish in limbo. Moreover, changes in
Iran’s policy to pressure Afghans to repatriate are
equivalent to denying refugees a say in their own future.
Although Afghans are temporary refugees in Iran, and
will not receive citizenship even if they are born in this
country or despite years of habitual residency, they may
prefer their rather stable housing in exile over struggling
to find a decent shelter in Afghanistan (Barr and Sanei
2013; Garakani 2009). In this context, our study provides
valuable lessons learned and implications for other
groups of refugees. As conflict in Syria enters its seventh
year, hosting fatigue could happen in the future in Syrian
refugees’ host countries. Therefore, return-focused refugee management policies might be hastily enforced. This
enforcement could put refugees at risk of secondary displacement. High levels of collaboration between different
sectors is required to assure, access to land, shelter, security, livelihood, and basic standards of living for a successful repatriation of returnees. Lessons learned from
this study encourage stakeholders to note that secondary
displacement after repatriation could cause harm for all
parties.

shelter, security, livelihood opportunities, and basic standards of living. In this context, further attention should
be given to livelihood opportunities and minimum standards of living in the allocated lands under the LAS.
Moreover, there is a need for more regulation in the
housing market in Afghanistan to prevent arbitrary increases in rent costs. Reports indicate that landlords in
Afghanistan see the influx of returnees as an opportunity
to raise rents (Samuel Hall et al. 2018). Provided cash
assistances for covering rent by UNHCR, NRC, or
UN-Habitat could be released directly to landlords with
a guarantee for fixed rates in longer periods of time. In
short-term, prefabricated transitional shelters could be
used for immediate accommodation of returnees. This
accommodation could be critical within the first month
after return, when Afghans seek protection and assess
their ability to integrate or move again (Majidi 2017).
Pre-fabricated shelters such as RHU can be shipped in
two flat boxes (dimensions of 196 cm in length, 110 cm
in width, and 24 cm in height) weighing 160 kg and assembled by four trained people in 5 to 6 h. A unit of
RHU provides 17.5 m2 of sturdy covered floor area with
the durability of 1.5 to 3 years (UNHCR n.d.).

Recommendations

Limitation

The findings of this study call for a reevaluation of voluntary repatriation as a durable solution in the absence of a
decent shelter in Afghanistan. In this context, there is a
need for a systematic research on returnees and secondary
displacement in Afghanistan. Moreover, long-term planning is required to enhance Afghanistan’s capacity to
properly accommodate returnees. Years of conflict have
crippled Afghanistan’s vital organizations, and large repatriation programs have placed pressure on local communities. Furthermore, higher levels of burden sharing are
required in Afghanistan’s infrastructure to expand housing
and shelters in the country for returnees. For instance,
investment is required to develop new houses in
Afghanistan, reducing the pressure in the housing market
and providing affordable accommodation for returnees.
There is also a need to develop a centralized land ownership system to prevent land disputes.
In the meantime, as part of the repatriation programs
planning should take place to assure decent housing for
any returnee. This could be a pull factor facilitating the
repatriation of Afghans. Despite evidence of better outcomes among returnees who received assistance before
departure, current support for Afghan returnees is provided only after return (Majidi 2017). In this context,
further coordination is required between the international organizations, donors, local stakeholders in
Afghanistan, and governments of host countries. Addressing returnees’ shelter needs require collaboration
between different sectors to assure access to land,

The dataset utilized in this study to assess the housing situation of Afghans in Iran was collected from a
non-probability sample in 2011. Therefore, the results
might not be representative of the entire population
of Afghans in Iran and their current situation. Moreover, in the absence of a comprehensive study on the
housing situation of Afghan returnees, we relied on
existing reports, news, and studies. Consequently, our
assessment about the housing situation of Afghan returnees might not be the best representation of the
current housing situation.
Abbreviations
BAFIA: Bureau for Aliens and Foreign Immigrants Affairs; IDMC: International
Displacement Monitoring Center; IDP: Internally Displaced People;
IOM: International Organization for Migration; LAS: Land Allocation Scheme;
MGSOG: The Maastricht Graduate School of Governance; NRC: Norwegian
Refugee Council; OEF: Operation Enduring Freedom; RHU: Refugee Housing
Unit; SIGAR: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction; UNHabitat: United Nations Human Settlements Programme; UNHCR: United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; UNICEF: United Nations Children’s
Fund; UNOCHA: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs; USAID: United States Agency for International Development;
WHO: World Health Organization
Availability of data and materials
Interested researchers can contact the first author for data requests.
Authors’ contributions
MN and SP conceived the idea of this study. MN conducted the systematic
search, calculated the descriptive statistical analyses, and drafted the paper.
MP and PS provided major contributions to the final manuscript. All authors
read and approved the final manuscript.

Naseh et al. Journal of International Humanitarian Action (2018) 3:13

Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.

Publisher’s Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published
maps and institutional affiliations.
Author details
1
School of Social Work, Robert Stempel College of Public Health and Social
Work, Florida International University, Miami, USA. 2Department of
Architecture, College of Communication, Architecture + The Arts Florida
International University, Miami, USA.
Received: 2 March 2018 Accepted: 27 July 2018

References
Abbasi-Shavazi M, Glazebrook D, Jamshidiha G, Mahmoudian H, Sadeghi R (2005)
Return to Afghanistan? A study of Afghans living in Iran. Afghanistan
Research and Evaluation Unit, Kabul http://www.academia.edu/7932338/
RETURN_TO_AFGHANISTAN_A_Study_of_Afghans_Living_in_Tehran.
Accessed 18 Dec 2017
Abbasi-Shavazi M, Glazebrook D, Jamshidiha G, Mahmoudian H, Sadeghi R (2008)
Second-generation Afghans in Iran: integration, identity and return.
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, Kabul https://areu.org.af/wpcontent/uploads/2016/01/823E-Second-Generation-Afghans-in-Iran-CS-2008.
pdf. Accessed 18 Dec 2017.
Adelkhah F, Olszewska Z (2007) The Iranian Afghans. Iranian Studies 40:137–165.
https://doi.org/10.1080/00210860701269519
Ahmadi B, Lakhani S (2016) The forced return of Afghan refugees and
implications for stability. PeaceBrief 199:1–5
Assessment Capacities Project. (2016) ACAPS Briefing Note: Undocumented
returnees in Afghanistan. https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/afghanistanacaps-briefing-note-undocumented-returnees-pakistan-27-august-2016.
Accessed 18 Dec 2017.
Ahmadinejad, M (2011) Multidimensional Poverty and Inequality among Afghan
Refugees: The Case of Afghan Refugees Residing in Selected Areas of Iran
(Master's Thesis) Alzahra University. https://ganj-old.irandoc.ac.ir/articles/
527076. Accessed 8 August 2018.
Azizi S, Hosseini SE, Basavaraju C (2017) Evaluating performance of Iran’s
domestic laws on effective protection of refugees. Journal of International
Academic Research for Multidisciplinary 5:70–89
Babister E, Kelman I (2002) The emergency shelter process with application to
case studies in Macedonia and Afghanistan. The Martin Centre University of
Cambridge, Cambridge http://shelterpakistan.org/media/1096/shelter_case_
studies_2002.pdf. Accessed 18 Dec 2017
Barr, H., Sanei, F. (2013) Unwelcome guests: Iran’s violation of Afghan refugee
and migrant rights. Human Rights Watch, NY. https://www.hrw.org/report/
2013/11/20/unwelcome-guests/irans-violation-afghan-refugee-and-migrantrights. Accessed 18 Dec 2017.
Crea TM, Loughry M, O’halloran C, Flannery GJ (2017) Environmental risk: Urban
refugees’ struggles to build livelihoods in South Africa. International Social
Work 60:667–682
Ender MG (2010) War causes and consequences. Contemporary Sociology: A
Journal of Reviews 39:399–402. https://doi.org/10.1177/0094306110373236a
Farrokhi, F., Rahmati, M. H. (2010).The Driving Forces of Iran’s Baby Boom https://
pdfs.semanticscholar.org/26ed/983bb39d68c10d6ac0b4a9ccd9570c135ec6.
pdf. /. Accessed 12 July 2018.
Garakani, T. (2009) Place-making in the margins: A case study of Afghan refugees in
Iran (1980–2001) Columbia University. https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy.fiu.
edu/docview/304865350?pq-origsite=gscholar. Accessed 8 Aug 2018
International Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC) (2018) Afghanistan http://
www.internal-displacement.org/countries/afghanistan/. Accessed 4 May 2018.
International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2016) Undocumented Afghan
returnees appeal. International Organization for Migration, Kabul https://
www.iom.int/sites/default/files/country_appeal/file/IOM-AfghanistanReturnee-Appeal-Sep-Dec-2016.pdf. Accessed 18 Dec 2017
International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2017) Baseline mobility
assessment summary results. International Organization for Migration, Kabul
https://afghanistan.iom.int/sites/default/files/Reports/iom_dtm_afg_baseline_
assessment_round1_summary_results.pdf. Accessed 18 Dec 2017

Page 11 of 12

Jacobsen K (2005) The economic life of refugees. Kumarian Press, Bloomfield
Kamminga J, Zaki A (2018) Returning to fragility, exploring the link between
conflict and returnees in Afghanistan. Oxfam, Oxford https://reliefweb.int/
sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/rr-returning-fragility-afghanistan-310118-en.
pdf. Accessed 4 May 2018
Kent, S., Ahmed, S., Naqibullah. (2017) Labour and housing market systems in
Nangarhar. Oxfam and Assistance for Health, Education, and Development
Afghanistan (AHEAD), Kabul http://www.baag.org.uk/sites/www.baag.org.uk/
files/resources/attachments/Oxfam_EMMA_Nangarhar_Report_May_2017.pdf.
Accessed 18 Dec 2017.
Koepke B (2011) The situation of afghans in the Islamic republic of Iran nine
years after the overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Middle East
Institute: Refugee Cooperation 4:1–13
Landinfo (2012) Report, Afghan Citizens in Iran. Landinfo, Storgata https://
landinfo.no/asset/2063/1/2063_1.pdf. Accessed 4 May 2018
Loschmann C, Parsons CR, Siegel M (2015) Does shelter assistance reduce
poverty in Afghanistan? World Development 74:305–322
Macdonald I (2011) Landlessness and insecurity: Obstacles to reintegration in Afghanistan.
Middle East Institue-Fondation Pour La Recherche Stratgique, Washington
Majidi N (2013) Home sweet home! repatriation, reintegration and land allocation in
Afghanistan. Revue Des Mondes Musulmans Et De La Mditerrane 133:207–225
Majidi N (2017) From forced migration to forced returns in Afghanistan: Policy
and program implementation. Migration Policy Institute, Washington https://
www.migrationpolicy.org/research/forced-migration-forced-returnsafghanistan. Accessed 18 Dec 2017
Marchand K, Siegel M, Kuschminder K, Majidi N, Vanore M, Buil C (2014)
Afghanistan migration profile. International Organization for Migration, Kabul
https://afghanistan.iom.int/sites/default/files/Reports/afghanistan_migration_
profile.pdf. Accessed 18 Dece 2017
Margesson R (2007) Afghan refugees: current status and prospects. Congressional
Research Service, Washington https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33851.pdf.
Accessed 18 December 2017
Milani MM (2006) Iran’s policy towards Afghanistan. The Middle East Journal 60:235–256
Montygierd-Loyba, H., Aiken, M., Adeyemi, F., Hassrat, H., Franzi, A., Alimi, M.
(2014) Norwegian refugee council Afghanistan information, counseling and
legal assistance. https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/evaluations/
afghanistan%2D%2D-information-counselling-and-legal-assistance-iclaprogramme-evaluation.pdf. Accessed 18 Dec 2017.
Moravej M (2014) Cross-cultural adaptation among young Afghan refugees
returning from Iran to Afghanistan. University of Ottawa, Dissertation
Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) (2015) NRC Afghanistan- fact sheet. https://
www.flyktninghjelpen.no/globalassets/pdf/fact-sheets/afghanistan-fact-sheetjuly-2015.pdf. Accessed 18 Dec 2017.
NRC 2017 Norwegian Refugee Council’s Country programme in Afghanistan:
Factsheet Sept 2017 https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/fact-sheets/2017/
afghanistan/july/nrc-country-factsheet-afghanistan.pdf. Accessed 1 August 2018
Qadeem M (2005) Chapter 1, Afghanistan: the long way home. In: Banerjee P,
Chaudhury SBR, Das SK (eds) Internal displacement in south Asia: The
relevance of the UN’s guiding principles. Sage, New Delhi, pp 30–61
Rajaee B (2000) The politics of refugee policy in post-revolutionary Iran. The
Middle East Journal 54:44–63
Rao S, Turkstra J (2014) Enhancing security of land tenure for IDPs. Forced
Migration Review 46:15–18
Roe A (2008) Water management, livestock and the opium economy: Natural
resources management, farming systems and rural livelihoods. Afghanistan
Research and Evaluation Unit, Kabul https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/
files/resources/855A159D714CBB77492574F500275D8C-Full_Report.pdf.
Accessed 18 Dec 2017
Rostami-Povey E (2008) Afghan women’s resistance and struggle in Afghanistan
and diasporic communities, 2004–2005. School of Oriental and African
Studies, University of London, London doi:RES-000-22-0762
Ruiz HA (2004) Afghanistan: Conflict and displacement 1978 to 2001. Forced
Migration Review 13:8–13
Samuel Hall, NRC, IDMC (2018) Escaping war: where to next? A research study on the
challenges of IDP protection in Afghanistan. http://samuelhall.org/wp-content/
uploads/2018/01/NRC-IDP_Afghanistan_FINAL.pdf. Accessed 18 Dec 2017.
Scalettaris G (2010) Refugees or Migrants? The UNHCR’s Comprehensive Approach
to Afghan Mobility into Iran and Pakistan. In: The Politics of International
Migration Management. Palgrave Macmillan, London, pp 252–270
Schmeidl S (2009) Repatriation to Afghanistan: durable solution or responsibility
shifting? Forced Migration Review 33:20–22

Naseh et al. Journal of International Humanitarian Action (2018) 3:13

Sharp TW, Burkle FM Jr, Vaughn AF, Chotani R, Brennan RJ (2002) Challenges and
opportunities for humanitarian relief in Afghanistan. Clinical Infectious
Diseases 34(Supplement_5):S228
Simpson G, Ijaz S, Shuja A, Frelick B, Gossman P, Sunderland J et al
(2017) Pakistan coercion, UN complicity: The mass forced return of
Afghan refugees. Human Rights Watch, New York https://www.hrw.org/
sites/default/files/report_pdf/pakistan0217_web.pdf. Accessed 18
Dec 2017
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) (2015) Afghan
refugees and returnees: Corruption and lack of afghan ministerial capacity
have prevented implementation of a long-term refugee strategy (Audit
Report No. SIGAR 15–83). https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR-15-83-AR.
pdf. Accessed 18 Dec 2017.
StataCorp LP (2015) STATA 12 [Computer software]. StataCorp LP, College Station
Statistical Center of Iran (2010) Income and expenditure form. Statistical Center
of Iran, Tehran
The Global Economy (2018) Afghanistan: Access to drinking water, urban https://
www.theglobaleconomy.com/Afghanistan/drinking_water_urban/. Accessed
4 May 2018.
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (2017)
Afghanistan’s Forced Displacement Legal & Policy Framework
Assessment. The International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development / The World Bank Group, Washington http://documents.
worldbank.org/curated/en/117261515563099980/pdf/122556-WPAfghanistanForcedDisplacementLegalandPolicyFrameworKAssessmentFPUBLIC.pdf. Accessed 4 May 2018
The Maastricht Graduate School of Governance (MGSOG), Samuel Hall (2012)
Evaluation of the UNHCR shelter assistance programme. http://samuelhall.
org/REPORTS/UNHCR%20Shelter%20Assistance%20Programme%20Evaluation.
pdf. Accessed 18 Dec 2017
The Sphere Project (2011) Chapter 4: minimum standards in shelter, settlement
and non-food items. In: Darcy J, Picard M, Bishop J, Smith C, Klynman Y,
Mierop ESV et al (eds) Humanitarian charter and minimum standards.
Belmont Press Ltd., Northampton, pp 203–248 http://www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/
95884/D.01.02.a.%20SPHERE%20Chap.%204-%20shelter%20and%20NFIs_
%20English.pdf. Accessed 18 Dec 2017
The World Bank (2017) Access to electricity (% of population). https://data.
worldbank.org/indicator/EG.ELC.ACCS.ZS. Accessed 18 Dec 2017.
UNHCR (2014) Solution Strategy for Afghan Refugees to Support Voluntary
Repatriation, Sustainable Reintegration and Assistance to Host Countries,
Portfolio of Projects, Islamic Republic of Iran. http://www.unhcr.org/
561786e29.pdf. Accessed 4 May 2018.
UNHCR (2015a) Solution Strategy for Afghan Refugees to Support Voluntary
Repatriation, Sustainable Reintegration and Assistance to Host Countries,
Portfolio of Projects2015–2016, Islamic Republic of Iran. http://www.unhcr.
org/539ab62a9.pdf. Accessed 4 May 2018.
UNHCR (2015b) Solution Strategy for Afghan Refugees to Support Voluntary
Repatriation, Sustainable Reintegration and Assistance to Host Countries,
Portfolio of Projects 2015–2016, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. http://www.
unhcr.org/539ab7f79.pdf. Accessed 4 May 2018.
UNHCR (2016a) Chapter 7: Solutions for refugees in The 10-point plan in action.
UNHCR, Geneva, pp 184–206 http://www.unhcr.org/50a4c17f9.pdf. Accessed
18 Dec 2017
UNHCR (2016b) Shelter Design Catalog. UNHCR, Geneva https://cms.emergency.
unhcr.org/documents/11982/57181/Shelter+Design+Catalogue+January
+2016/a891fdb2-4ef9-42d9-bf0f-c12002b3652e
UNHCR (2017a) Global trends: Forced displacement in 2016. UNHCR, Geneva
http://www.unhcr.org/5943e8a34. Accessed 18 Dec 2017
UNHCR (2017b) UNHCR Afghanistan Voluntary Repatriation Monthly Report, June
2017. UNHCR, Kabul https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/59085.
Accessed 4 May 2018
UNHCR (2017c). Update on UNHCR’s operations in Asia and the Pacific,
Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, Standing
Committee, 68th meeting. http://www.unhcr.org/58ca4ade7.pdf. Accessed
14 July 2018.
UNHCR (n.d.) Refugee Housing Unit–RHU. UNHCR Shelter and Settlement
Section, Geneva https://cms.emergency.unhcr.org/documents/11982/57181/
Refugee+Housing+Unit+Fact+Sheet/7b4fce59-0af2-45ea-9386-7fde249d2fe9.
Accessed 18 Dec 2017
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR] (2012) International
Conference on the Solution Strategy for Afghan Refugees to Support

Page 12 of 12

Voluntary Repatriation, Sustainable Reintegration and Assistance to Host
Countries https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/62341.pdf.
Accessed 4 May 2018.
United States Agency for International Development [USAID] (2017) Afghanistan
- Complex Emergency, Fact Sheet #1, Fiscal Year (FY) 2018 https://www.
usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/afghanistan_ce_fs01_12-272017.pdf. Accessed 4 May 2018.
WHO, UNICEF (2017) Progress on drinking water, sanitation and hygiene: 2017
update and SDG baselines file:///Users/mitranaseh/Downloads/JMP-2017report-final%20(1).pdf. Accessed 1 August 2018
Wyckoff, M. E. (2016). Securing tenure in shelter operations, guidance for
humanitarian response. https://www.sheltercluster.org/sites/default/files/
docs/nrc_shelter_tenure_guidance_external.pdf. Accessed 18 Dec 2017.

